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THE INTERNET
Edward D. Kania*
During the past ten years, the internet has
emerged from an obscure collection of military
and scientific databases linked together for na-
tional security purposes' to the current global sys-
tem providing access to a multitude of artistic, en-
tertainment and commercial sites. Any individual
with access to a computer and an internet account
may now participate in a global exchange of
knowledge and ideas without having to leave the
confines of his home. Consequently, the internet
is changing the way that we, as a society, interact,
gather information and entertain ourselves.
In addition to access to information, the in-
ternet is also changing the manner in which com-
mercial transactions occur. Through the use of
webpages, 2 merchants are now able to create vir-
tual storefronts on the internet, allowing them to
display images and descriptions of their products,
allow for interaction between the consumer and
the commercial entity and promote the purchase
of the goods. Due to the global nature of the in-
ternet, the physical location of the seller is irrele-
* Edward D. Kania is an associate with the Washington,
D.C. telecommunications law firm of Bennet & Bennet,
PLLC where he specializes in cable television, alternative
video services and internet matters.
1 One of the principal reasons behind the creation of the
internet was to ensure that lines of communication between
numerous military and scientific databases would remain in-
tact after a national emergency such as a nuclear strike. See
Sean Selin, Governing Cyberspace: The Need for an International
Solution, 32 GONz. L. REv. 365, 367-68 (1997). Simplified, the
internet is a redundant set of connections between various
databases. See id. By creating this configuration, the military
was ensured that even if one link was destroyed, it could con-
tinue to transmit information through surviving locations.
See id. Eventually, non-military uses of the internet devel-
oped evolving into the present day internet. See id.
2 A webpage is nothing more than an information site
which can be purchased by individuals or commercial enti-
ties. The webpage acts as a storefront in which the owner
may advertise and sell his or her product. One can succinctly
define a "webpage," or alternatively a "website," as "a collec-
vant to its consumer base that can, regardless of
their locale, examine and purchase the business'
goods.
The internet also allows individuals to complete
business contracts quicker and more efficiently.
Through the use of electronic mail ("e-mail"), an
individual may instantaneously transmit a contract
offer to another party. That party, regardless of
location, can then review the document, consent
to its contents by accepting the offer and instanta-
neously re-send the document back to the
originating party. This results in more expedited
transactions and overall lower transaction costs.
Internet transactions are particularly cost effec-
tive for those businesses that are content provid-
ers. 3 By advertising and selling their content on
the internet, a business eliminates overhead costs
such as stores, sales staff and the costs of maintain-
ing adequate levels of inventory. They can pass
these savings along to the consumer by means of
lower prices. 4 The content providers will also be
able to eliminate the problem of the understock-
tion of files stored on a file server that is accessible to users of
the World Wide Web, a network of servers and information
available on the internet." Susan A. Dunn, Negotiating Web
Site Agreements, 16th ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW,
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADE-
MARKS AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK 467, 469
(1996).
3 Content providers are those businesses that mass pro-
duce copies of musical, artistic or literary works. Such prov-
iders include record and book stores and their suppliers.
4 An example of this new type of retailer is Amazon.com,
which contends it is the world's largest bookstore due to the
fact that it claims to hold on its virtual shelves 10 times as
many books as even the largest physical bookstore (approxi-
mately 2.5 million books). See Christopher Anderson, Survey
of Electronic Commerce: A River Runs Through It: Amazon.com
Offers a Glimpse of the Future., ECONOMIST, May 10, 1997. It
does this by keeping only the top selling 400 titles in stock.
See id. It orders the others books from a nearby distributor.
Amazon is price competitive and is able to meet or beat most
conventional bookstore even when shipping costs are in-
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ing of entertainment products. As no physical
product is being transferred to the consumer, the
retailer will always have sufficient quantity of the
product to meet consumer demand.5 In addition,
through new technologies that link television and
the internet,6 content providers are able to tie-in
products to commercial television programming.
Consequently, by utilizing internet sales, the en-
tertainment industry can reduce costs and use
targeted marketing to sell its product.7
However, before this commerce explosion can
occur, one must develop a method for verifying
the transmission of data through the internet. In
particular, it must accomplish the ability to verify
the "signature" of the transacting individuals read-
ily and provide reasonable security to the transac-
tions.8 Although several alternative methods for
verifying such signatures exist, the most promis-
ing method appears to be through the use of digi-
tal signatures in which documents are encrypted
using a computer key system. ' To facilitate the
adoption of digital signatures as a means of verify-
ing contractual data, the American Bar Associa-
tion promulgated its Digital Signature Guidelines
in 1996,10 to be used as a model for state and fed-
eral digital signature laws. Several states, includ-
ing Florida 1 and Utah, 12 have already adopted
such laws, and several others, including the Dis-
trict of Columbia, are considering such measures.
Although these state initiatives are well-meaning,
this desired explosion in the commercial use of
the internet cannot occur until a federal digital
signature law is adopted.13 In addition, while the
ABA Guidelines may serve as a general founda-
tion for this national law, several key provisions of
the ABA Guidelines must be revised to ensure
cluded. See id.
5 The internet purchaser receives an electronically-trans-
mitted copy of the original master of the product. Therefore,
the seller will never "sell-out" of a particular product if the
master is not damaged or destroyed. See id. (describing the
ability of Amazon.com to rapidly acquire products from the
manufacturers and wholesalers).
6 Cable modems are a new technology that are gaining
popularity. See generally Rob Fixmer, Microsoft Combines TV,
Computer and the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1998 (visited
March 1, 1999) <http://www.nytimes.com> (describing the
increased integration of the internet and television). This
technology allows for the transmission of both cable televi-
sion signals and internet connection through the same wir-
ing. See id. Consequently, an individual may be able to watch
her favorite show and, through her remote control, then
search the internet for tie-in items such as books and T-shirts.
See id.
7 See id.
that the legal framework behind a national digital
signature law is sufficiently comprehensive.
This essay addresses the need for a federal digi-
tal signature law and details the structure that
such a law should take. It begins by examining
the historical basis for digital signatures in com-
merce and how the new technology of the in-
ternet affects many historical preconceptions of
signatures. Next, the essay delves into possible so-
lutions to the problem of signatures on the in-
ternet. In addition, it focuses on how "digital sig-
natures" actually work and how the concept of
digital signatures is the best solution to the di-
lemma of on-line signatures.
The essay then focuses on several possible mod-
els for a digital signature law, including the Amer-
ican Bar Association's Digital Signature Guide-
lines14 and Utah's Digital Signature Law, 15 and
why a federal digital signature law is preferable to
multiple state laws. Finally, the essay addresses
several inherent problems in these models and ex-
plores methods to ensure that the contracting
parties are sufficiently protected legally without
being encumbered by a burdensome signature
process.
I. THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF
"SIGNATURES"
The ability to authenticate data, including the
data's source, is a necessary component of any
commercial transaction. 16 Before one can under-
take a commercial venture, the involved parties
must be able to verify the accuracy of the data that
is the basis for the transaction, 17 a fact that is true
8 See Bradford Biddle, Legislating Market Winners: Digital
Signature Laws and the Electronic Commerce Marketplace, 34 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1225, 1228-29 (1997).
9 See id.
10 DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, 1996 A.B.A. SEC. SCI.
& TECH. INFO. SECURITY COMMITrEE 1 [hereinafter GUIDE-
LINES].
11 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 282.72-75 (West Supp. 1998).
12 See Utah Digital Signature Act, UTAH CODE ANN. 1953
§ 46-3-101 et al. (1995).
13 See 143 CONG. REC. H7293-03 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1997)
(statement of Rep. Gordon).
14 See GUIDELINES, supra note 10.
15 See Utah Digital Signature Act, supra note 12.
16 See David R. Warner, Jr., Authenticating Digital Signa-
tures, NETWORK2D NEWSLETTER (ABA Sec. Law Management
Practice, Chicago, Ill.), Winter 1996, (visited Mar. 1, 1998)
<http://www.abanet.org> [hereinafter Warner].
17 See id.
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for even the most basic cash transactions."' This
verification is normally accomplished by confirm-
ing the data's source and the identity of the con-
tracting parties. 19 In this way, the parties are held
liable for the accuracy of the data, including any
promises either explicitly or implicitly transmitted
within that data.20
Traditionally, contracting parties have used cer-
tain formalisms, such as signatures and seals, as a
means for verifying the identity of the parties. 21
When used within a contract, these formalisms
will legally bind the parties to the transmitted data
and will legally verify the author's identity.
22
Therefore, use of these formalisms within a con-
tractual situation has been seen as necessary for
the orderly flow of commerce.
The signature is the most commonly used for-
malism in modern written commercial transac-
tions.23 While certain types of contractual rela-
tionships, such as those lasting more than one
year, are voidable unless signed by the parties;24
other contracts, while not per se invalid, are unen-
forceable in court if not signed.25 Consequently,
a signature not only verifies the party's identity in
a transaction but also, in certain circumstances, is
a mandated element of a legally enforceable con-
tract between the signatories.
Webster's Dictionary defines the term "signa-
ture" as "the name of one as written by oneself."26
However, as used in the legal context, the defini-
tion is much broader. According to Uniform
Commercial Code 1-201(39), "signed includes any
symbol... executed or adopted by [a] party with
present intention to authenticate [a] writing."2 7
Therefore, one need not limit a "signature" to the
cursive writing of an individual's name. Rather, a
signature may include a mark or symbol, as long
18 A purchasing party must feel confident that the repre-
sentations made about the sold item are correct (i.e., that a
purchased sweater is 100% wool or a new type of knife will
never need sharpening). Similarly, the selling party must be
assured that the data contained in the transferred currency is
correct (i.e., that the piece of paper given to the seller actu-
ally represents a certain monetary amount).
19 See id.
20 Judge Learned Hand stated "[a] man must indeed
read what he signs, and he is charged if he does not . . ."
Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602
(2nd Cir. 1947).
21 See id. See also Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form,
41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 800 (1941).
22 See id.
23 See Warner, supra note 16.
24 See U.C.C. § 3-401 (1990).
as that symbol is used with the party's present in-
tent to authenticate a writing.
However, not all signatures will be sufficient to
evoke the legal protections given to signed docu-
ments. For one to consider a signature legally ac-
ceptable, it must demonstrate the attributes of
both signer authentication and document authen-
tication. 28 "Signer authentication" refers to
whether the signature is sufficiently explicit to de-
note who has signed the written document. 29 In
addition, the signature must be sufficiently
unique so another individual may not reproduce
the signature without authorization.30 Likewise, if
the signature is so generic that it cannot be veri-
fied, it is useless in binding the signatory to the
signed document.
One means to overcoming these hurdles is the
use of a notarizing system in which a neutral third
party, the "notary," authenticates the validity of
the signature after the party has sufficiently
proven his identity to the notary. 31 Commonly, a
notary verifies the signature by reviewing the sig-
natory's personal identification such as a passport
or drivers license. The notary affirms the signa-
tory's identification through a notary stamp and a
contracting party may legally rely on the notary's
verification that the signature is authentic.3 2
"Document authentication" requires that the
signature identify the data the signatory accepted
so one may not alter the data after the signature
has occurred.33 The parties accomplish this by re-
quiring the signature on the embodiment of the
data so that no one can alter the document after
the parties sign it. 4 In this way, both parties are
assured that the data to which they attested by
signing the document is the same data that is
transmitted to the other party.
25 See GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 5.
26 WEBSTER'S II NEW RIvERSIDE UNrvERsrY DICTIONARY
1083 (1988).
27 U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (1998).
28 See GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 6.
29 See id. at 7.
30 See id.
31 See id. at 16, 37-38. (discussing the role of a "CyberNo-
tary").
32 See id. at 38.
33 See id. at 8.
34 The involved data is usually placed in a standard writ-
ten form with the signature placed below the data. See GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 10, at 8. Alterations to the data can then be
determined by relying on the physical dimensions of the pa-
per used, any obvious. changes to the document (i.e. white-
out) and the layout of the text. See id.
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II. THE NEED FOR "SIGNATURES" ON
THE INTERNET
Because signatures are a vital element of com-
merce, consumers must develop the ability to sign
documents transmitted over the internet. The na-
ture of the internet, where all communications
are typed rather than handwritten, does not lend
itself to traditional notions of "signatures." It is
not sufficient on the internet to use the tradi-
tional method of fixing one's signature at the end
of a document since such a method cannot meet
the dual authentication requirements. First, the
signature will not meet the signer authentication
requirement, as the signature will possess no
unique characteristic that will ensure the identity
of the signatory.3 5 Since all communications on
the internet are typewritten, there is no opportu-
nity to evaluate the uniqueness of a signature to
determine if it is authentic. In addition, tradi-
tional notions of a notary reviewing the signed
document are impractical since the notary is in no
better position to authenticate the signature than
the contracting parties.
Likewise, document authentication is more dif-
ficult to accomplish on the internet. As previously
discussed, the validity of the data contained in
"paper" transactions is much easier to ascertain by
examining the document for any obvious altera-
tions. However, digital documents are relatively
easy to reproduce and alter, and such modifica-
tions are nearly impossible to detect.36 In addi-
tion, it is almost impossible to determine whether
the document was altered before or after it was
signed.
Since internet commerce cannot operate under
the traditional notions of signature verification,
we must develop a new verification regime for
such commerce. Several alternatives currently ex-
ist which seek to solve this internet signature
35 See Emiliojaksetic, How to Ensure the Integrity of Digitally
Transmitted Documents, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1996, at 21.
36 See id. (discussing the threats posed to the authenticity
and integrity of digital documents).
37 Under the public key encryption scheme, one cannot
unscramble a message unless the proper public key is used
and no alternation in the document has occurred. See id.
Therefore, if the recipient receives and successfully unscram-
bles the message, he may be confident that one has not al-
tered the message. See id.
38 See GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 46.
39 The term "digital signature" has grown to include a
host of different technologies as well as the general concept
of affixing personal responsibility for the transmission of
problem. One proposed solution is the use of en-
cryption technology to ensure the integrity of the
communication. This allows the signatory to "en-
code" the signed document. Only the receiving
party would be able to decode the document us-
ing a special code, called a "public key." The use
of a public key encryption scheme enables the re-
cipient of an encrypted message to verify the in-
tegrity of the message and ensure that no altera-
tion has taken place, thereby satisfying the
document authentication requirement for "signa-
tures."37 However, as this system uses "public
keys" available to a wide range of people rather
than any type of "private keys" used only by one
person, there is no way to verify the identity of the
signatory. 38 Therefore, the encryption carries no
legal weight to "bind" the encrypting party to the
document's underlying facts and will not satisfy
the signer authentication prong.
A second possible solution is the concept of
"digital" signatures 3 9 which are based on the crea-
tion of an asymmetric cryptosystem. An individ-
ual seeking to use such a system would be re-
quired to develop two cryptography keys which
would be distinct for that individual. 40 The "keys"
are actually two different but related mathemati-
cal algorithms that one develops by use of an ap-
propriate computer system. 41 The individual en-
crypts their message by using the first "private"
key, known only to the individual. At that point,
the recipient receives the message in the en-
crypted form.
The recipient receives the location of the sec-
ond, "public" key to decode the message. A neu-
tral third party holds and surrenders this "public"
key to the recipient upon request. The recipient
then uses the "public" key to decode the message
so he could read it.42
An underlying technological process, termed
data in "cyberspace." Id. at 32-33. For purposes of this pa-
per, the term "digital signature" will be used to refer to the
creation of an asymmetric cryptosystem for verifying the
identity of the signatory and ensuring the integrity of the
signed record. See id.
40 See Charles R. Merrill, Proof of Who, What and When in
Electronic Commerce Under the Digital Signature Guidelines, 525
PRACTISING L. INST. PAT. 131, 133-34 (1998).
41 See Henry R. King, Note, Big Brother, The Holding Com-
pany: A Review of Key-Escrow Encryption Technology, 21 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 224, 231 (1995).
42 For an in-depth explanation of how digital signature
technology operates, See GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 3.
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the "hash function," is the secret to the success of
the "digital signature." A "hash function" is an al-
gorithm which produces a unique digital repre-
sentation, or "fingerprint," called a "hash result"
which is imbedded in the text of the signed docu-
ment.43 The hash result is based on the use of the
"private key" and the specific message to be
signed. It is impossible for any two "hash results"
to be identical since any change in either the pri-
vate key or in the text of the message results in a
different "hash result."44 The nature of the "hash
function" makes it unfeasible to either derive the
original message from knowledge of only the hash
result or to alter the content of the message with-
out changing the hash result.45
The recipient's use of the "public key" reverses
the process of creating this "hash result." By us-
ing the public key and the hash result contained
in a received message, the recipient "recreates"
the 6riginal message. However, if the message was
originally forged (a private key which does not
correspond to the public key was used to sign the
message), the public key will not properly interact
with the hash result and the recipient cannot re-
trieve the message. Likewise, if one alters the
message, prior to its receipt, then it will alter the
hash result and one cannot recreate the original
message from the public key.
The "digital signature" system accomplishes the
necessary authentication requirements for a le-
gally-binding signature.46 For the system to work
one must use corresponding private and public
keys in order to allow the recipient to ascertain
the identity of the signatory.47 Since only the sig-
natory has possession of the private key, only that
person will be able to "digitally sign" a document
so that it may be unencrypted by the recipient.
Therefore, one would meet the signer authentica-
43 GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 10. See also Randy V.
Sabett, International Harmonization in Electronic Commerce and
Electronic Data Interchange: A Proposed First Step Toward Signing
on the Digital Dotted Line, 46 AM. U.L. REv. 501, 522-23 (1996).
44 See GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 10-11.
45 See C. Bradford Biddle, Comment, Misplaced Priorities:
The Utah Digital Signature Act and Liability Allocation in a Public
Key Infrastructure, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1143 (1996).
46 See Gary W. Fresen, What Lawyers Should Know about
Digital Signatures, 85 ILL. B.J. 170 (1997).
47 See Anthony Martin Singer, Note, Electronic Commerce:
Digital Signatures and the Role of the Kansas Digital Signatures
Act, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 725, 731 (1998).
48 See Scott N. Godes, Note, Government Contracting on the
Internet: Abandoning FACNET as the Government's Network for
Electronic Commerce, 26 PuB. L. J. 663 (1997).
tion requirement. Similarly, since message altera-
tion would be readily apparent because the public
key will not successfully interact with the
message's hash result, the integrity of the docu-
ment would be readily ascertainable. One can en-
sure the confidence of the recipient that no alter-
ation has taken place during the transmission of
the message by enabling the recipient to retrieve
the encrypted text. Consequently, one would
meet the requirement of document authentica-
tion.48 Digital signatures would therefore appear
to be the means by which internet commerce
could achieve the "signature" requirement neces-
sary for commercial transactions. The creation of
a uniform system for implementing this new tech-
nology would allow for the quick integration of
new users into the system and would create the
entities necessary for the overall operation of the
digital signature system.
In 1996, the Information Security Committee of
the American Bar Association promulgated Digi-
tal Signature' Guidelines to try to meet this need
for a method of authenticating signatures on the
internet.49 While the Guidelines do offer a tech-
nical and legal structure for a digital signature sys-
tem, they are not intended to serve, in their cur-
rent form, as a model for a digital signature
statute.50 Rather, the Guidelines serve only as the
starting point for the design of a "reliable" system
and an appropriate digital signature statute.
It is critical, at this juncture, to realize the dual
role that the Guidelines seek to play in the crea-
tion of a reliable signature authentication sys-
tem.5 1 Because several alternative means of verify-
ing document and signature integrity exist, such
as public key encryption, the Guidelines must not
only devise a legal strategy for regulating the best
signature authentication system, it must advocate
49 See William E. Wyrough, Jr. & Ron Klein, The Electronic
Signature Act of 1996: Breaking Down Bariers to Widespread Elec-
tronic Commerce in Florida, 24 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 407, 432
(1997).
50 See GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 20.
51 Although the Guidelines serve this dual role of system
creation and system regulation, this essay will only address
the latter role. Obviously, if regulators adopt another means
for verifying signatures on the internet (i.e., encryption), the
Guidelines would be useless in regulating such a system.
Therefore, this essay will assume that an asymmetric cryptog-
raphy system is the most desirable means of verifying such
signatures. Consequently, the sole question to be addressed
in this paper is how to best regulate this asymmetric cryptog-
raphy system.
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a particular authentication system. 52 In meeting
this hurdle, the Guidelines argue for the imple-
mentation of an asymmetric cryptography system
to verify internet signatures. In addition, the
Guidelines create three separate yet intercon-
nected entities that will interact in every digital
signature transaction. Based on that proposed
system, the Guidelines then turn to the task of as-
signing legal rights and duties to the systems par-
ticipants.
III. THE PROPOSED ASYMMETRIC
CRYPTOGRAPHY SYSTEM
The Guidelines envision three distinct entities
participating in the digital signature system: the
subscriber, the certification authority, and the re-
cipient. To begin the signatory process, the sub-
scriber, who is the prospective signatory, must cre-
ate a public and private key pair, using an
appropriate computer program which has been
identified as a "trustworthy"53 method.54 Since
the key pair is reusable, the subscriber may per-
form an unlimited number of signatures using the
same key pair. Once the subscriber generates the
key pair, he then delivers a copy of the public key,
as well as proof of the subscriber's identity, to the
certification authority. The subscriber, however,
will retain his private key and will not disclose it to
anyone, including the certification authority.
The certification authority serves as an interme-
diary between the subscriber and the recipient. It
is the authority's responsibility to confirm both
the subscriber's identity and the validity of the
subscriber's key pair.55 In this manner, the certifi-
52 SeeJane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets and
Regulation of Internet Commerce, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1177, 1240-41
(1998).
53 The Guidelines define a trustworthy system as:
[c]omputer hardware, software, and procedures that:
(1) are reasonably secure from intrusion and misuse; (2)
provide a reasonably reliable level of availability, reliabil-
ity and correct operation; (3) are reasonably suited to
performing their intended functions; and (4) adhere to
generally accepted security principles.
GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 54.
54 See id. at 78.
55 See id. at 68. Since the subscriber retains her private
key, the certification authority must devise some means to
verify that the subscriber's private and public keys are a func-
tioning key pair. The Guidelines fail to address how this may
be accomplished. One solution to this dilemma would be to
require the subscriber to use the key pair generation service
of a third party which could certify that the keys are a func-
tioning pair.
cation authority serves a function similar to a no-
tary: to act as an impartial verifying agent for the
subscriber's signature.
Once the certification authority has verified the
subscriber's identity and that the private and pub-
lic keys are a functioning key pair, it issues a "cer-
tificate." The certificate lists the subscriber's
name, other identifying information about the
subscriber, and the subscriber's public key. 56 The
certification authority then presents the certifi-
cate to the subscriber who "accepts" the certificate
by verifying the accuracy of the contained infor-
mation.57 Once the subscriber "accepts" the cer-
tificate, he may then begin to use the key pair to
"digitally sign" documents.
5
The guidelines require the certification author-
ity to place all of its current certificates in an on-
line repository for access by potential recipients. 59
In addition, the certificate authority must also
place, in the repository, a certification practice
statement.60 This document explains the general
methods employed by the certification authority
to verify subscribers. In addition, the statement
includes reference to some other reliable source
which will verify the authenticity of the certifica-
tion authority itself.61
The recipient, upon receipt of the encrypted
document, would access the repository and the
subscriber's certificate. 62 If no valid certificate ex-
ists for the subscriber, the recipient would then be
placed on notice that the integrity of the digital
signature may be in doubt and the signature may
be a forgery.63 However, if a valid certificate exists
in the repository, the recipient would use the pub-
lic key listed in the certificate to retrieve the
56 See GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 68-69.
57 See id. at 21-22.
58 See id. at 35-36.
59 See id. at 47.
60 See id. at 67. See also id. at 39-40 (defining a certifica-
tion practice statement).
61 For the recipient to place any value on the subscriber's
certificate, the recipient must first determine the legitimacy
of the certification authority. See GUIDELINES, supra note 10,
at 37-38. Since the certification authority's representations
regarding the subscriber are key to the viability of the digital
signature system, the recipient must be confident that the
certification authority is a legitimate entity. See id. While the
Guidelines do not require that the certification authority be
state licensed, the authority, at the least, should use some
neutral third party to verify its digital signature. See id. The
Guidelines envision a long chain of authorities verifying
other authorities who verify other authorities. See id.
62 See id. at 86-89.
63 See id.
[Vol. 7
The ABA's Digital Signature Guidelines
signed message. 64
IV. LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES 1JNDER
THE GUIDELINES
Pursuant to the Guidelines, each of the three
entities bears certain responsibilities to ensure the
integrity of the digital signature system. If an en-
tity fulfills its obligations under the Guidelines, it
will be legally shielded from the consequences of
any forged documents. Conversely, an entity
which fails to meet its responsibilities may be held
liable for the damage caused by a forged docu-
ment even if the forgery was caused by some third
party source. Through this "carrot and stick" ap-
proach, the Guidelines seek to create a digital sig-
nature system which will ensure the integrity of
digitally signed documents.
Pursuant to Guidelines, the subscriber has
three distinct responsibilities within the digital sig-
nature system.65 First, the subscriber must pro-
vide, upon application for a certificate, truthful
data to the certification authority regarding his
identity. 66 The subscriber is not entitled to rely,
as a defense to misrepresentation of personal data
to the authority, on the authority's' failure to in-
dependently verify the accuracy of that data.67
The subscriber is also prohibited from digitally
signing any documents unless a valid certificate
exists at the time of the signature or unless the
subscriber notifies the recipient that no valid cer-
tificate exists.68 Since the certificate provides ver-
ification of the subscriber's identity, the recipient
has no independent means of verifying the sub-
scriber's identity absent a valid certificate. Unless
the recipient is aware that no certificate exists and
that the recipient would be accepting any digitally
signed document at his own risk, the subscriber
retains full responsibility for all documents which
he digitally signs.69
Finally, the subscriber must safeguard his pri-
vate key and, upon knowledge of theft of the pri-
vate key, must inform the certification authority
64 See id. at 117.
65 See id. at 101-05.
66 See id. at 101-03.
67 See id. at 76-77.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 74-77.
70 See id. at 103-06.
71 See id. at 77-79.
72 While the Guidelines also require the authorities to
have adequate financial resources to operate and require cer-
of the endangerment of the key.70 A chief tenet
of the digital signature system is that only the sub-
scriber or his authorized agent may use the sub-
scriber's private key. If the key is compromised
(i.e. stolen or copied), it would enable a forger to
digitally sign documents in the name of the sub-
scriber without either the certification authority
or the recipient being able to detect the forgery.
Therefore, the subscriber must ensure the integ-
rity of the private key and must inform the author-
ity of any compromising of the key so that one can
suspend the certificate. 71
While the certification authority has numerous
responsibilities under the Guidelines, 72 two of its
responsibilities relate to the integrity of the signa-
ture system. The authority is responsible for the
validity of all statements made within an accepted
certificate. This includes warranting that, at the
time of the creation of the certificate, the per-
sonal information regarding the subscriber is ac-
curate, unless otherwise specifically stated in the
certificate, and that the subscriber holds a func-
tioning key pair which has not been compro-
mised. 73 In addition, the authority warrants that
it is in compliance with all applicable require-
ments of the Guidelines.74 Obviously, to allow re-
cipients to rely on the validity of the certificate,
the certification authority must verify that the in-
formation contained in the certificate is accurate
unless otherwise stated.
It is the responsibility of the authority to sus-
pend or revoke the certificate if necessary. The
authority must either suspend or revoke the certif-
icate either upon the request of the subscriber or
upon knowledge that representations contained
within the certificate are no longer valid or the
subscriber's key pair has been compromised. 75 If
suspension or revocation is not based on the
owner's request, the authority must also promptly
notify the subscriber that the certificate is no
longer valid. 76 Finally, in all cases, the authority
must notify-usually by placing some notice on
the certificate itself-all potential recipients seek-
tain record-keeping procedures, these requirements usually
apply to the payment of damages for any liability incurred by
the authority. See GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 63. That is,
they do not apply to the integrity of the system. See id.
Therefore, they are excluded from further discussion in this
paper.
73 See GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 66-67.
74 See id. at 66.
75 See id. at 73-74.
76 See id. at 74.
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ing to verify the subscriber's signature that reli-
ance on the certificate is no longer warranted. 77
The recipient is charged with one main respon-
sibility to the signature system. A recipient's reli-
ance on a digitally signed document must be "rea-
sonable" even if a valid certificate exists and the
public key properly corresponds to the sub-
scriber's private key.78 For a recipient to "reason-
ably" rely on a signature, the recipient must have
no actual knowledge that either the subscriber or
the certification authority has breached any of
their various assigned duties under the Guide-
lines.79 The recipient must therefore "reason-
ably" believe both that the certificate is authentic
and that the subscriber has not misrepresented
any information contained in the certificate or al-
lowed the key pair to be compromised.
In addition to actual knowledge of a breach of
the system's integrity, the recipient must also
weigh several other factors in determining the
"reasonableness" of relying on the signature.
These factors include prior dealings between the
subscriber and the recipient, the value and impor-
tance of the signed message, and usage of trade or
any other extrinsic evidence as to the validity of
the signature.8 11 According to the Guidelines, one
must consider these additional factors above and
beyond reliance on the certificate.-' Conse-
quently, the recipient must consider all relevant
factors in deciding whether to rely on the digital
signature which has been received. Unless these
factors indicate that the signature is not reliable,
the recipient is legally entitled to rely on the digi-
tal signature and the signed message will be
deemed to be as "valid, effective, and enforceable
as if the message had been written on paper." 2
The Guidelines are only one possible scheme
77 See id. at 75.
78 See id. at 86.
79 See id. at 87-88.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 Id. at 106.
83 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 - 46-3-504 (Michie Supp.
1998).
84 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 282.70 - 282.75 (West Supp.
1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325K.001 - 325K.27 (West Supp.
1999); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 - 46-3-504 (Michie
Supp. 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.34.010 - 19.34.903
(West Supp. 1999); See also ScottJensen, AB 811 Regulates the
Use of Digital Signatures in Wisconsin, 71 Wis. L. REV. 23 (1998);
Anthony Martin Singer, Note, Electronic Commerce: Digital Sig-
natures and the Role of the Kansas Digital Signatures Act, 37
WASHBURN L.J. 725 (1998) [hereinafter Singer]; Utah Becomes
for regulating digital signatures. However, the in-
dustry sources generally approve the Guidelines
and they have been used as a basis for the Utah
Digital Signature Law,8 3 one of the most compre-
hensive laws on digital signatures in the United
States. Because of the Guidelines general accept-
ance and the overall soundness of its regulatory
scheme, it is a proper starting point for a digital
signature law. However, several problem areas
within the Guidelines, which are detailed below,
need to be addressed.
The first important question is which legislative
forum should adopt the digital signature laws. As
previously stated, several states have already
adopted digital signature laws in varying forms . 4
The House of Representatives has considered a
federal digital signature law and, on November 8,
1997, the House introduced the "Electronic Fi-
nancial Services Efficiency Act of 1997," an ex-
tremely basic digital signature bill. 15 In addition,
there is a strong push occurring among members
of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, held in
Rome in November, 1997, for the creation of an
international regime for digital signature laws.8 6
With legislative action on so many levels contain-
ing varying provisions, it is important to deter-
mine the most effective legislative level for a new
digital signature law while promoting the greatest
use of the internet.
A digital signature law enacted at the Federal
level would achieve the goals of usability and pro-
mote the greatest increase in internet commerce.
Because the internet does not lend itself to tradi-
tional notions of territorial jurisdiction, the adop-
tion of individual states digital signature laws
would thwart the purposes behind digital signa-
tures.8 7 Traditionally, the location of the con-
First State to Provide for Digital Signatures, 15 COMPUTER LAw. 26
(1998). By the spring of 1998, sixteen states had enacted dig-
ital signature laws, and eighteen states had digital signature
bills pending before their legislatures. See Singer, supra at
731.
85 H. R. 2937, 105th Cong. (1997).
86 See TABD Participants Focus on Electronic Commerce,
EUROWATCH, Nov. 28, 1997.
87 See Juan Andres Avellan, John Hancock in Borderless
Cyberspace: The Cross-Jurisdictional Validity of Electronic Signatures
and Certificates in Recent Legislative Texts, 38JuRIMETRICSJ. 301,
302 (1998); see generally Christopher E. Friel, Downloading a
Defendant: Is Categorizing Internet Contacts a Departure From the
Minimum Contacts Test, 4 ROGER WM. U. L. REV. 293 (1998)
[hereinafter Friel]; Katherine Sheehan, Predicting the Future:
Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First Century, 66 U. CIN. L.
REV. 385 (1998) [hereinafter Sheehan]; Michael E. Solimine,
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tracting parties determines the law governing the
contract.88 However, due to the ethereal nature
of the internet, such notions are unworkable.
The internet consists of thousands of separate
databases, all located in different jurisdictions,
which contain all of the internet's data. 9 For ex-
ample, a British user, using his laptop computer
on a business trip in Florida, could conceivably
enter into a contract, over the internet, with an
Ohio firm, whose website is located on a Minne-
sota computer.90 Determining the law to apply in
this transaction would be complex. Therefore,
adopting numerous inconsistent state digital sig-
nature laws adds another layer of complexity in
determining which law to use and would frustrate
internet commerce.
It would likewise be problematic to rely on an
international regime for digital signatures. Cur-
rently, the United States prohibits the exportation
of strong encryption software for fear that ter-
rorists and hostile foreign powers will use such
technology for improper uses against the United
States.91 Any international agreement would then
have to revolve around the use of weaker, less ef-
fective encryption software. A digital signature re-
gime cannot properly work without the use of
strong encryption schemes to create the key pairs.
An international standard would force the United
States to either require the use of weaker encryp-
tion schemes, which are not currently banned, or
to create a dual tier encryption system where con-
tracts created within the United States would util-
ize one encryption method and contracts created
outside the United States would utilize a second
type of encryption. In either instance, an interna-
tional regime would produce an inferior digital
signature system with less user protection.
Because state or international law would not as-
sist in the creation of a unified, workable digital
signature system, the use of federal law is the only
alternative. Federal law would enact one unified
digital signature statutory scheme in which the lo-
cation of the parties and their databases would be
irrelevant. A federal law would standardize the re-
quirements for the certification authorities, regis-
The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. REv. 1
(1998).
88 See 8 Richard A. Lord, Williston's Law of Contracts
§ 19:4 (4th ed. 1998).
89 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884-85 (1997), ACLU
v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831, 848 (1996).
90 See Sheehan, supra note 87, at 411-12, 417-20.
tration certificates and the type of encryption,
and would afford contracting authorities greater
legal protection.
V. PROPOSED STRUCTURE FOR FEDERAL
DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW
The Information Security Committee did not
intend the Digital Signature Guidelines to serve as
a fully-contained, complete model for digital sig-
nature legislation. Rather, the Committee real-
ized that any legislation creating a workable digi-
tal signature system would need to address the
Guidelines' shortcomings.92 However, even in
those areas which are addressed, the system envi-
sioned by the Guidelines is flawed. While the new
federal law may take its structure from the Guide-
lines, several key areas need improvements.
Successful digital signature law must address:
(1) privacy protection, (2) the verification of the
subscriber's identity, (3) the successful generation
of the key pair and its continued integrity, (4) the
level of reliance which the signature recipient
may attach to the signed document and (5) the
procedures for suspending the subscriber's certifi-
cate. Unless the digital signature regime can suc-
cessfully overcome the problems in each of these
five areas, the overall regime will fail and will ex-
pose the various parties to unwarranted legal lia-
bility.
A. Privacy Protection
An effective digital signature law must ensure
the confidentiality of both the contents of the
contractual data and the identity of the con-
tracting parties. The system has to ensure that the
contents of the transmitted document remain
confidential to everyone except the contracting
parties. For internet transactions, this breach in
confidentiality would likely arise if the transmitted
document is intercepted, either intentionally or
unintentionally by a third party. In addition, pri-
vacy is a significant concern for internet contracts
since the interception of the document will be sig-
91 See Glen T. Oxton, Digital Signatures: Potential and Pit-
falls, N.Y.LJ.,Jul. 21, 1997 at S6 [hereinafter Oxton], Alan N.
Sutin, Roadblocks Stall Electronic Commerce, Legal Obstacles Hin-
der International Trade in Cyberspace, N.Y.L.J., Jul. 13, 1998 at
S6.
92 See GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 20.
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nificantly harder to detect in internet commerce
than in traditional commercial transactions. In
current paper contracts, the theft of the contract
will be easy to detect since the physical paper will
be missing. If the recipient fails to receive the
contract, he will quickly know that it has fallen
into unintended third party hands. However, with
internet contracts, detecting such theft is signifi-
cantly harder. A third party may intercept the
communication and copy its contents without ac-
tually stopping the transmission of the data to its
intended parties. Therefore, the parties will not
know that a third party has possession of their
document.
Similarly, while the contents of the document
may not be confidential, the identity of the parties
to the contract may be extremely private. For ex-
ample, in the entertainment arena, a third party's
knowledge that an intercepted document is a con-
tract for the sale of a manuscript may not be as
important as knowing whether the purchasing
party is a major film producer or an unknown
film school student.9 3 Consequently, an effective
digital signature regime must address both con-
tent and contracting party privacy issues.
The dual key encryption system devised in the
Guidelines overcomes these two hurdles. Even if
a third party intercepts the document, that party
would be unable to unencrypt the document with-
out access to the public key. Without that public
key, which one could not acquire from the certifi-
cation authority without proper authorization, the
document is a useless series of unintelligible char-
acters. In the same vein, the third party would be
unable to determine the identity of the signatory.
Through the use of anonymous e-mail addresses,
the signatory could choose to remain anonymous.
The unintended recipient would not be able to
decipher the signatory's identity and, once again,
unless the third party had access to the public key,
it could not decipher the message to determine
the exact signatory. Therefore, the Guidelines are
sufficient in their current form to meet these pri-
vacy hurdles and they will need no additional
modifications to protect privacy.
93 See Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress, In-
dividual Reference Services, (1997) (visited Feb. 3, 1999) <http:/
/www.ftc.gov/privacy> (containing information concerning
online consumer protection). For example, knowledge that
a manuscript was being purchased by Steven Spielberg would
significantly elevate the status of the manuscript and conse-
B. Personal Information Verification
The Guidelines are insufficient in the area of
personal information verification and must be re-
vised for any federal digital signature law. The ver-
ification of the personal information of the sub-
scriber is perhaps the most critical element of any
digital signature system. The certification author-
ity is charged under the Guidelines with verifying
the personal information of the subscriber. The
recipient will rely in large part on the certification
authority's review of the subscriber's identity and
the verification of the subscriber's credentials. If
the authority fails to adequately verify the sub-
scriber's identity, an imposter could impersonate
a signatory, secure a key pair and begin executing
contracts using this false identity. The recipient
would be unaware of such fraud until after he had
relied on the contract and sought performance of
its terms. The Guidelines fail to properly address
the problem of adequate verification of the sub-
scriber's personal information throughout the op-
erational period of the certificate. Because the in-
tegrity of the digital signature system is largely
based on the truthfulness of the representations
made by the certification authority in the certifi-
cate, the authority must adopt sufficient methods
to confirm the subscriber's identity and the integ-
rity of the subscriber's key pair. The Guidelines
requires the authority to verify the subscriber's
personal information prior to issuing a certifi-
cate.9 4 while the Guidelines do not suggest a spe-
cific method for verifying the data, the Guidelines
do require that the authority confirm the infor-
mation through "appropriate inquiry and investi-
gation. '95 The Guidelines urge the authority to
specify, in the certification practice statement, the
means by which the certifying authority confirms
the information.96 Therefore, the Guidelines do
require a pre-certification investigation but are si-
lent on the exact process for such an investiga-
tion.
To allow a certain degree of flexibility, the fed-
eral law should create several alternative methods
for identity verification which are reliable but not
quently its price. Therefore, if such knowledge became pub-
lic, it could begin a bidding frenzy for the manuscript.
94 See GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 68.
95 Id. at 34.
96 See id. at 68.
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overly burdensome to the subscriber. Various ver-
ification options currently exist, each with their
own strengths and weaknesses and each of which
could be utilized as a verification method. A certi-
fication authority may be able to verify the sub-
scriber's identity through the use of another au-
thority's certification of the subscriber. If the
subscriber already possesses a dual key group
from another certification authority, that author-
ity would have issued its own certificate regarding
the subscriber. The second authority could then
simply rely on that certificate for its own verifica-
tion of the subscriber's identity. Of course, the
reliability of the second certificate would only be
as good as the verification procedures used in the
first certification. In addition, depending on the
regulation of certification authorities eventually
developed, the first certification authority may fal-
sify a subscriber's certificate if it is a "bad actor"
authority.
An alternative verification method is to require
in-person verification of the subscriber. 9 7 Much
like the current practice of appearing, in person,
to a notary with appropriate personal documenta-
tion, the certification authority could require that
the subscriber appear at its offices before it will
issue a certificate. While this would cut down on
the incidents of fraud, it defeats the purpose be-
hind on-line contracts. The basic premise behind
internet commerce and on-line signatures is to al-
low the subscriber to conduct business without
having to physically travel to a location. Even
though this verification process would only occur
one time, some internet purists may feel that the
purposes behind on-line contracts are thwarted by
even this one-time inconvenience.98
Another potential pitfall for subscriber identifi-
cation is the need to continually update the truth-
fulness of the subscriber's personal information.
In addition to the original verification of the sub-
scriber's identity, the certification authority must
also re-verify the subscriber's personal informa-
97 See Oxton, supra note 91, at S6.
98 Even in non-internet transactions, some entities are
forgoing physical appearance for the purposes of informa-
tion verification. See U.S. State Department-Passport Infor-
mation Website (visited Feb. 3, 1999) <http://www.travel.
state.gov/passporteasy.html>. For example, passport issu-
ance, which at one time required in person verification, may
now be done through the mail. See id.
99 See GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 78.
100 See id. at 68.
101 See 101 DIGITAL SIGNATURE DRAFT. GUIDELINES, at
tion over the operational life of the certificate.
During the term of the certificate, a subscriber's
name and address may change, thereby affecting
jurisdictional concerns. In addition, the agency
relationship contained in the certificate may cease
during the operational period. A certificate is
useless if it is factually correct at the time of its
issuance but later contains outdated, false infor-
mation. For an effective digital signature system,
a recipient must be able to rely on the certificate's
validity at all points in the certificate's life. 99 This
necessitates re-verification of the subscriber's in-
formation during the certificate's life, usually
through means similar to those used to initially
verify the subscriber.
A re-verification requirement is absent from the
current Guidelines. While the Guidelines require
an initial verification, there is no continuing duty
to re-verify. 100 In fact, in its October 5, 1995
Draft, the Guidelines' authors admit that no re-
verification requirement exists in the Guidelines
and that none should be inferred.101 The Guide-
lines rely solely on the subscriber to notify the cer-
tification authority of any factual changes which
need to be addressed in the subscriber's certifi-
cate. 
02
This "one time" verification of the subscriber's
information by the certification authority is a de-
parture from the verification procedures notaries
use in "paper" signature transactions. 10 3 Cur-
rently, a signatory must present his identification
(usually a driver's license or some other personal
identification card) to the notary each time he
seeks to have his signature verified. In addition, a
notary's notarization applies only to the docu-
ment to which it is attached and cannot be used
to verify the signatory's identity for any other
transaction. 10 4 This is quite different from the
Guidelines which require the certification author-
ity to verify the subscriber's identifying informa-
tion once, even though the certificate could last
indefinitely. 105
Comment 3.13.2 (American Bar Ass'n Comm. on Info. Sec.)
(1995)
102 See id.
103 See 4 ANDERSON'S MANUAL FOR NOTARIES PUBLIC
(1996) (describing the common procedures used by a notary
public).
104 See id. at 21.
105 The Guidelines do not address the specifics of how
the certification authority will verify the subscriber's identity
and information. One suggestion made by the Guidelines,
however, is that the certification authority rely on any other
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The new federal digital signature law must
therefore depart from the Guidelines and require
regular re-verification of the subscriber's identity.
Because the Guidelines shield the certification au-
thority from any liability if an initial verification
wasconducted, and because the "bad actor" sub-
scriber will have either absconded or will be judg-
ment-proof, it will force the recipient to bear the
full brunt of any damages caused by a forged doc-
ument if it does not mandate re-verification. 10 6
Placing such a high burden on the recipient, who
has fully complied with her responsibilities under
the Guidelines, will have a chilling effect on any
recipient's willingness to use digital signature
technology.
To remedy this omission, the federal law must
require re-verification of the subscriber's personal
data. The law should require the certification au-
thority, at regular intervals throughout the opera-
tional period of the certificate, to re-verify, the
subscriber's personal data. The method for the
re-verification can be the same type implemented
for the initial verification and should be specified
in the certification practice statement. The au-
thority should also state, in the subscriber's certifi-
cate, the date of the last verification. In this way,
the recipient may weigh, in addition to the other
"reasonableness" requirements of Guideline 5.4,
the reliability of a digital signature which he has
received based on the length of time since the last
certification.
C. Key Generation
The next major hurdle for the federal law to
overcome is the issue of the generation of the key
pair. Since the feasibility of the system relies on
the key pair working properly and inhibiting third
party access to the signed documents, federal law
must be explicit in how one generates the keys
and the computer standards by which one judges
the security of the keys.1 0 7
The Guidelines fail to adequately address the is-
sue of key pair generation by allowing subscribers
to generate their own key pair so long as they use
a trustworthy system.' 08 The limitations of the
digital signature certificate, granted by another certification
authority, which the subscriber may possess.
106 See GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 88, 104.
107 See id. at 52.
108 See id. at 78.
109 See id.
guidelines encourage fraud and multiple, incom-
patible generation systems. Therefore, federal
law must go beyond the requirements set forth in
the Guidelines.
Under the Guidelines, the generation of the
key pair is the exclusive responsibility of the sub-
scriber who is required to use a "trustworthy" sys-
tem. 109 Although the Guidelines do not delineate
either a specific cryptographic algorithm or com-
puter system to be used, they do define "trustwor-
thy systems" to be "[c]omputer hardware,
software, and procedures that: (1) are reasonably
secure from intrusion and misuse; (2) provide a
reasonably reliable level of availability, reliability
and correct operation; (3) are reasonably suited
to performing their intended functions; and (4)
adhere to generally accepted security princi-
ples." 110 Therefore, any system which appears to
meet these requirements would be deemed "trust-
worthy" under the Guidelines and a subscriber
could use the system to generate the key pair.111
The Guidelines' position on key generation has
several serious flaws. First, by allowing the sub-
scriber to generate his own key pair, the Guide-
lines allow for the possibility of fraud on the part
of the subscriber. If the subscriber is allowed to
generate his own keys, the subscriber could gener-
ate a key pair system which would allow him to
alter digitally signed documents after their trans-
mission (i.e. create a key pair which defeats the
document integrity ability of the hash results and
allows the signatory to alter the document even
after it has been signed).112 Even though a key
pair may be "improper," the certification author-
ity may not be able to detect the abnormality and
may deem both the key pair and the system used
to generate them to be "trustworthy." The ulti-
mate burden of any financial harm caused by a
forged document would rest squarely with the re-
cipient since the certification authority would
have fulfilled its requirements under the Guide-
lines and the "bad faith" subscriber would have
either absconded or be judgment proof.
Even if the subscriber generates the key pair in
"good faith," the lack of a generating system stan-
dard may seriously impair the operation of the
110 Id. at 68.
1Mi See id.at 101.
112 See Emilio Jaksetic, How to Ensure the Integrity of Digi-
tally Transmitted Documents, CoRP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1996, at
21 (providing an explanation of this problem).
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signature system. Several digital signature stan-
dards currently exist and are in active use.113 If
subscribers are allowed to generate their own key
pair, the subscriber may select a generating stan-
dard which is incompatible with the certification
authority or the digital signature system used by
the recipient.1 14 Use of multiple key generation
standards could lead to the growth of incompati-
ble digital signature systems being developed
which would make the use of digital signatures
burdensome and unappealing for use in verifying
internet contracts. 115
The federal digital signature law can avoid
these pitfalls by creating a fourth entity which
would exclusively be charged with generating key
pairs. In fact, the Guidelines recognize that, while
it does not require subscribers to use a particular
entity, key pair generation businesses would likely
develop as part of a digital signature regime. 116
This service would be regulated by appropriate
law similar to the regulation of the certification
authority, and would be operated by a neutral
third party whose exclusive task would be to gen-
erate key pairs using an appropriate digital signa-
ture standard.1 17 It would require a subscriber to
use such a service to generate his key pairs in con-
formity with the standard used by his certification
authority.""
Requiring the use of a key pair generation sys-
tem would not inhibit the use of digital signa-
tures. The cost of purchasing a key pair from
such a service would be a minimal expense' 19
which would ensure the interested parties of the
113 See id.; see also Oxton, supra note 91, at S16.
114 Oxton, supra note 91.
115 An analogous situation may be the dual personal
computer systems (i.e., Macintosh compatible vs. IBM com-
patible) which currently exist. One digital signature system
may employ a "X" generation standard while another system
may employ "Y." A potential recipient, who possesses the
technology to use the "Y" system, would not be able to receive
any messages using the "X" technology. Similarly, a sub-
scriber may be forced to have a key pair generated, and cer-
tificates verified, for each type of "system" which exists. Both
of these scenarios will lead to greater costs for the partici-
pants.
116 See GUIDELINES, supra note 10.
117 One could address the "multiple system" problem by
the establishment of a universal key generation standard. See
e.g., H.R. 695, 105th Cong. (1998). However, since that ques-
tion addresses the structure of the digital signature system,
and less to its regulation, it will not be further addressed in
this essay.
118 The generation service would be required to certify
that it has generated the particular key pair which the sub-
scriber has submitted to the certification authority. See Oxton,
integrity of the key pair. Requiring the use of a
generation service would eliminate the current
problems associated with the Guidelines. The
generation of the key pair by a neutral third party
would curtail the incidences of fraud because a
neutral third party would have no interest in gen-
erating an unreliable key pair. Additionally, it
would enable the generation authority to certify
the; manner in which the keys were generated and
attest to the integrity of the key pair. 120
This service would also alleviate some of the
problems with the use of multiple digital signa-
ture standards. These generation services will ad-
vise a subscriber as to the optimal standard to use
for his particular needs as well as to the standard's
compatibility with the certification authority's sys-
tem.' 21 Therefore, requiring the use of key gen-
eration services not, only promotes the creation of
new business but also shores up the integrity of
the digital signature system.
Finally, federal law should establish life spans
for all key pairs. As technology continues to ad-
vance, older key pairs, while invulnerable at the
time of their creation, may become compromised.
In addition, the longer the key pairs are in use,
the greater likelihood that one may accidentally
reveal it to a third party. Requiring the subscriber
to regularly re-generate new key pairs will ensure
that the pairs are of the highest quality and that
they have not been compromised. Since the cost
of generating these key. pairs is relatively low, this
requirement will not impede use of the digital sig-
nature system.
supra note 91, at S15.
119 While this essay does not address the economic feasi-
bility of the Guidelines system, it should be noted that this
additional step in using the digital signature system will not
be unduly burdensome. Since the Guidelines envision that
the subscriber himself would have the technical ability to
generate a key pair, such a process cannot be either overly
expensive or difficult. Therefore, the per-pair cost of genera-
tion of the keys by the generation service should not dissuade
individuals from using digital signatures.
120 This certification could be similar to the certification
authority's certificate practice statement and be publicly ac-
cessible through an on-line repository. See Kenneth A. Free-
ling & Ronald E. Wiggins, States Develop Rules for Using Digital
Signatures, Laws that Govern Transactions using Public Key Cryp-
tography Will Spur Electronic Commerce, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 20,
1997, at ClI [hereinafter Freeling].
121 See Wendy R. Leibowitz, Laws on E-Sigs Inked, Compet-
ing Technologies Test States'Definitions of an Electronic Signature,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 17, 1997, atAl (suggesting consumers need
protection from fraud when they have little understanding of
the system).
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D. Digital Signature Reliance by the Recipient
Another major obstacle to a successful digital
signature regime is the allocation of risk to the re-
cipient of the signed document. The recipient
stands the most to lose from a forged or otherwise
improper digitally-signed document and the re-
cipient will bear the brunt of detrimentally relying
upon a contract that is later revealed to be invalid
or forged. Therefore, before a digital signature
system can be widely used in commercial transac-
tions, recipients must be confident that they will
receive adequate legal protection under a digital
signature law. The drafters must build strong pro-
tections into the system so that the recipient may
both rely on the signed document and believe
that the courts enforce the contract and require
the signatory to perform on the contract. Only
then will recipients agree to use this media to con-
duct their business.
The current Guidelines are inadequate to instill
confidence in recipients. The Guidelines place a
high burden on the recipient and will have a chil-
ling effect on the use of digital signatures. The
new federal law must significantly depart from the
Guidelines in this area and adequately protect the
interests of the recipients.
Under the current Guidelines structure, a re-
cipient is not legally entitled to rely on the signed
document simply because a facially valid sub-
scriber certificate exists and the public key, which
he obtained from the certification authority,
properly unencrypted the signed document. Un-
like traditional signatures, where the recipient
may rely on the notarization of the signature by a
licensed notary, 122 the digital signature recipient
must weigh four additional factors before he may
reasonably rely on the digitally signed document
as genuine. 123 For reliance to be reasonable, the
recipient must consider, in addition to the exist-
ence of a valid certificate, the following:
(1) facts which the relying party knows or of which
the relying party has notice, including all facts listed in
the certificate or incorporated in it by reference,
122 See Michael L. Closen & R. Jason Richards, Cyberbusi-
ness Needs Supernotafies, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 25, 1997, at A19. Of
course, if a notarized document appears to have been tam-
pered with (i.e. apparent erasures, crossed out words, etc.),
the recipient may not blindly accept the document as genu-
ine.
123 See GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 87. A relying party
assumes the risk that a digital signature is invalid if his reli-
ance was "unreasonable." Therefore, this "reasonableness"
(2) the value or importance of the digitally signed
message, if known,
(3) the course of dealing[s] between the relying per-
son and subscriber and the available indicia of reliabil-
ity or unreliability apart from the digital signature,
(4) usage of trade, particularly trade conducted by
trustworthy systems or other computer-based means.] 2 4
The Guidelines readily admit that no technology
is infallible and, therefore, these factors were in-
troduced to offset technological problems. 125 By
adopting these additional factors, the Guidelines
seek to shift part of the certification authority's li-
ability for signature verification onto the recipi-
ent.
Utah's Digital Signature Act of 1996,126 which is
modeled on the ABA's Guidelines, takes this con-
cept of "conditional reliance" one step further.
Under the Utah Act, a certification authority may
place, within a subscriber's certificate, recom-
mended monetary reliance limits. 12 7 A recipient
is urged to limit all contracts to the reliance limit
because it serves as the maximum damages that
one can require the authority to pay for any loss
caused by the recipient's reliance on the certifi-
cate.
The Guidelines' four reliance factors are an im-
proper attempt to re-allocate risk for these com-
mercial transactions. While the risk of forgery and
other improper activity is inherent in digital signa-
tures, it is also inherent in other manners of signa-
ture verification. The signing party can equally
falsify information to a notary and to a certifica-
tion authority. Identification can be faked and
documents altered in both ink and paper and in-
ternet dealings. Therefore, the Guideline's at-
tempts to compensate for deficiencies in the tech-
nology of digital signatures are unwarranted.
In addition, the factors cited by the Guidelines
would preclude many transactions from occurring
via the internet. The Guidelines list the value of
the subject matter of the contract, as well as prior
dealings between the parties, as two factors to
consider when evaluating the validity of the digital
signature. This precludes use of this technology
factor will affect the recipients right to seek damages if the
signature is determined to be a forgery. See GUIDELINES, supra
note 10, at 82.
124 GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 87.
125 See id. at 88.
126 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 - 46-3-504 (1996)
127 See id. at §46-3-309; See also Freeling, supra note 120 at
Cl.
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for larger contracts and for contracts involving
first-time contact between the parties. If recipients
are only legally protected when their contracts are
insignificant or with long-term trading partners,
the digital signature system becomes practically
worthless for the majority of transactions that
could benefit from the use of the internet. The
worth of the contract has no bearing whatsoever
on the effectiveness of the dual key system or on
the verification abilities of the certification au-
thority. Therefore, these factors are not only chil-
ling for the majority of contracts but also have no
bearing on the reliability of the signed document.
The Guideline's four factors will have a "chil-
ling" effect on commercial use of digital signa-
tures. Before businesses will adopt the use of digi-
tal signatures over traditional signatures, they
must be assured that digital signatures are both
reliable and are not more burdensome than "ink"
signatures. Neither of these conditions is met
under the current system. To obtain the same de-
gree of reliance associated with "ink" signatures
namely, that the notarized document is authentic
absent any glaring tampering, the recipient must
weigh past dealings with the subscriber and the
"trustworthiness" of the underlying computer sys-
tems used. Given the different reliance inquires
required by the two signature systems, many busi-
nesses will opt to remain with "ink" signatures
which require less additional research to verify.
To alleviate this "chilling" effect, the federal law
must shift the burden and responsibility of verify-
ing the authenticity of signatures back onto the
certification authority. While such a regime
would place greater legal liability on the certifica-
tion authority for any "tainted" signatures, these
authorities are in a better position to evaluate the
credibility of the subscriber's information and the
integrity of the key pairs, the two essential compo-
nents of the digital signature system. In addition,
the certification authorities have the most to gain
from a thriving, reliable digital signature system,
and more to lose from half-hearted attempts to
verify subscribers and their key pairs. The certifi-
cation authorities have enormous incentive to
scrutinize their subscribers and the integrity of
the entire digital signature system. Of course, if
the recipient has knowledge that a signature is
128 See Lonnie Elridge, Comment, Internet Commerce and
the Meltdown of Certification Authorities: Is the Washington State
forged or otherwise unreliable, he must be pre-
cluded from seeking damages against the certifi-
cation authority. However, absent that knowl-
edge, the recipient must be able to rely on a
received digital signature and the validity of the
subscriber's issued certificate.
E. Certificate Suspension/Revocation
Procedures
The final issue of concern that the Guidelines
fail to properly address is the procedure by which
one can suspend or revoke the subscriber's certifi-
cate. In traditional ink signatures, the signatory
would readily be able to ascertain whether the cer-
tification authority (i.e. the notary) will authenti-
cate his signature and identity since the notary
would either notarize or refuse to notarize the
document. However, in the internet, a signatory
may properly encode his document using their
key pair, only to find out after transmitting the
document that the certification authority revoked
the subscriber's certification. This would leave
the signed document in a legal limbo and ad-
versely impact the subscriber's ability to continue
to conduct business. Therefore, the certificate au-
thority must promptly notify the subscriber if his
certificate has been suspended or revoked and
the certificate authority must assure that revoca-
tion and suspension will only occur if "good
cause" exists. 128
Once again, the Guidelines fail in this area.
Under the Guidelines, a certification authority
may suspend or revoke a certificate in two situa-
tions. First, the authority may suspend/revoke a
certificate pursuant to a request by the sub-
scriber. 129 This situation will not unfairly affect
the subscriber as long as the certification author-
ity has verified that the subscriber, and not an im-
postor, is seeking the suspension/revocation.
The second suspension/revocation situation is
much more problematic. A certification authority
may suspend/revoke a certificate, without prior
notice or consent of the subscriber, if the author-
ity confirms that a material fact in the certificate is
false, a material prerequisite to the issuance of the
certificate was not satisfied, or that the integrity of
the subscriber's private key has been compro-
Solution a Good Model, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1805, 1821 (1998).
129 See GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 93.
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mised.130 While pre-suspension/revocation no-
tice is not required, the certification authority
must promptly notify the subscriber subsequent to
the authority's actions.13 1
The issue of notice to the subscriber involves
two divergent, conflicting interests. On the one
hand, a recipient must immediately be made
aware that the representations made in the certifi-
cate may be suspect and that reliance on the sig-
nature may not be warranted. Therefore, a certi-
fication authority must quickly move to suspend
or revoke a suspect certificate before an unwary
recipient uses the certificate to rely on a received
signature.
In conflict with this genuine concern is the po-
tential damage to the subscriber if his certificate is
unfairly suspended or revoked. The revocation of
an individual's certificate may seriously disrupt his
ability to conduct business.132 Likewise, the revo-
cation of a certificate implies that the subscriber is
either an imposter, a liar or- has carelessly lost his
private key. These allegations could be devastat-
ing to a business's reputation and could seriously
impact the subscriber's ability to utilize digital sig-
natures in the future. 133 If the revocation later
turns out to be unsubstantiated, the subscriber
will have been irrevocably injured without the
ability to challenge the suspension/revocation
before it became effective.
The Guideline's current policy of not requiring
pre-suspension/revocation notice solves the for-
mer but not the latter problem. By not requiring
pre-revocation/suspension notice, the Guidelines
allow the certification authority to quickly sus-
pend/revoke the subscriber's certificate to pro-
tect the recipient from harm. While this ap-
proach is effective when the underlying reasoning
for revocation is later confirmed, it is harmful if
the certification authority erred in revoking/sus-
pending the certificate.
The federal digital signature law can overcome
this dilemma by creating a new intermediary cate-
gory placed on the certificate prior to the sub-
scriber's notification. They would place this new
designation on the certificate once the authority
believes that the integrity of the certificate is in
question. However, the certification authority
would place the designation on the certificate
130 See id. at 73-74.
131 See id. at 96-97.
132 See id. at 74.
prior to any notice to the subscriber. The
designation would warn recipients that the certifi-
cation authority is temporarily unable to verify the
authenticity of the certificate's underlying facts
but that the certificate has been neither sus-
pended nor revoked. It would urge recipients to
use additional factors, such as prior contact be-
tween the parties and the worth of the signed doc-
ument, to determine the validity of the received
digital signature. It would also notify the recipi-
ent that the authority shall be held harmless for
any reliance by the recipient on the signature
from the time of the designation of the certificate.
Finally, the designation would also carry a dead-
line by which a final decision regarding the certifi-
cate would be made by the certification authority.
During the time between the placing of the
designation on the certificate and the deadline,
the authority would be required to notify the sub-
scriber, who would then have the opportunity to
prove the validity of the information contained
within the certificate. If the authority is satisfied
as to the validity of the certificate, the authority
would remove the new designation by the dead-
line and retroactively "certify" any signature cre-
ated during the prior questionable period. If the
certification authority is unable to verify the sub-
scriber's personal data or the integrity of the key
pairs, the authority would formally suspend or re-
voke the certificate and would retroactively "de-
certify" all signed documents during the question-
able period.
By creating this new designation, the federal
law would protect each of the involved parties.
The subscriber would be given pre-suspension/
revocation notice and an opportunity to prove the
validity of the certificate. In addition, if the certif-
icate is found to be factually correct, the sub-
scriber would face minimal business disruption or
loss of credibility. The certification authority
would be able to notify potential recipients of its
concerns regarding the validity of the certified in-
formation, but would not be liable for any loss
caused by a relying signature recipient. Finally,
the recipient would be placed on notice as to po-
tential problems with the certificate and would
need to seek additional factors to shore up his re-
liance on the signature. Therefore, all concerned
133 Knowledge of prior certificate revocations may im-
pact the "reasonableness" of a recipient's reliance pursuant
to Guideline 5.4 "reliance" factors. Id. at 87.
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parties would be adequately protected under this
new designation.
In conjunction with this new category, the new
federal law would need to contain a related provi-
sion dealing with the recipient's reliance on the
signed documents. As previously stated, the recipi-
ent is-lin a somewhat precarious position in the
area of reliance. If the recipient receives a docu-
ment which facially appears to be valid (i.e., the
public key works with the document) but no valid
certificate exists, the recipient should not rely on
the document under the current Guidelines.
However, if he fails to accept the contract and,
eventually, it is determined that the suspension/
revocation was incorrect, the recipient may be lia-
ble for breach of contract. Therefore, the federal
law must contain a provision stating that the re-
cipient shall not be liable for failing to perform
under a contract in which the subscriber's certifi-
cate was initially suspended/revoked, but was
later reinstated for that time period.
CONCLUSION
While both the internet and digital signatures
are still in their infancy, their potential to re-
sculpt the manner in which the public receives in-
formation and conducts its business transactions
is enormous. Geography and access to transporta-
tion become irrelevant as the individual can ex-
plore the globe from the comfort of his home.
However, like all new technologies, the pace for
the public to embrace these new tools is some-
what slow. One must change preconceived no-
tions and patterns before the general public will
embrace new technology.
The public must also feel safe in using this new
technology. For internet commerce, that entails
the knowledge that they will receive the same
level of legal protection and security as in tradi-
tional ink contracts. While digital signatures ap-
pear to be the technological means to promoting
and protecting commerce, they are ineffective
without a comprehensive digital signature law,
preferably at the federal level.
In creating this federal digital signature law, the
ABA's Guidelines provide an excellent starting
point. However, in several key areas, the Guide-
lines prove to be counterproductive to the goal of
protecting the commercial participants. Through
the legal modifications suggested above, a com-
prehensive, effective digital signature law is within
reach. Once a reliable means of ensuring the va-
lidity of internet contracts occurs, the paper con-
tract will become the horse and buggy of the new
millennium.
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